This paper quantitatively investigates equilibrium indeterminacy due to economies of scale (ES) in …nancial intermediation. Financial intermediation provides deposits (inside money) which can substitute with currency to purchase consumption, and depositing decisions are susceptible to non-fundamental con…dence (sunspot) shocks. With the intermediation sector calibrated to match US data: (i) indeterminacy arises for small degrees of ES; (ii) sunspot shocks qualitatively resemble monetary shocks; and (iii) monetary policies can stabilize the real impact of sunspot shocks, but only under complete information. The analysis also assesses the removal of these shocks on the volatility decline observed during the US Great Moderation.
Introduction
What are the conditions through which economies of scale (ES) in …nancial intermediation gives rise to equilibrium indeterminacy? When these conditions are satis…ed, what is the quantitative importance of non-fundamental shocks to con…dence in the …nancial sector on economic volatility? These questions are motivated by two distinct literatures: the literature on increasing returns to scale in production where indeterminacy delivers belief-induced business cycles (e.g. Benhabib and Farmer, 1994) , and the literature on banking crises where a strategic complementarity in intermediation delivers multiple (steady state) equilibria (e.g. Cooper and Corbae, 2002) . In contrast to the literature on indeterminacy from the production sector, this analysis builds on the empirical evidence of Hughes and Mester (1998) that banks of all sizes exhibit signi…cant economies of scale. 1 In contrast to the literature on banking crises, the potential for indeterminacy around a single steady state is quantitatively assessed in an otherwise standard, business-cycle environment. By combining elements of both literatures, this paper is a …rst attempt at quantitatively examining the signi…cance of banking as an avenue through which agents' beliefs (or animal spirits) can be a source of business-cycle ‡uctuations.
To illustrate how ES can deliver equilibrium indeterminacy, suppose intermediaries possess decreasing marginal costs of managing deposits and pass these costs onto depositors.
ES will distort the depositing decisions of the household and provide the basis for a strategic complementarity in the households' depositing decisions. If a single household believes that the deposit holdings of other households will decrease (increase), then her anticipated cost of holding deposits increase (decrease) and she will hold less (more) deposits. The sunspot shocks resulting from this strategic complementarity, which can be interpreted as self-ful…lling, belief-driven shocks to con…dence in the intermediary, will in ‡uence the composition of inside (deposit) and outside (currency) money holdings, aggregate prices, and potentially real quantities.
The intermediation technology described above is explored in an environment featuring multiple mediums of exchange (currency and deposits) as in Freeman and Kydland (2000) , …nancial intermediaries as in Corbae and Dressler (2009) , and nominal wage rigidity. Both currency and deposits can be used to purchase consumption, and …nancial intermediaries provide the necessary inside monetary component. When banks give rise to equilibrium indeterminacy, sunspot shocks have a nominal impact because they in ‡uence broad monetary aggregates which in turn in ‡uence aggregate prices. Nominal wage rigidity links these shocks to the real economy and delivers business-cycle ‡uctuations.
The results of the analysis are as follows. First, with the size of the intermediary sector calibrated to US data (a value added of approximately 1 percent of output), indeterminacy arises for small degrees of ES in the intermediation sector without the need for multiple productive sectors or unusual parameter values. 2 Second, since sunspot shocks and monetary shocks both in ‡uence the trade o¤ between inside and outside money balances, the real response of these shocks are qualitatively similar. Third, monetary policies are able to assuage the real (but not nominal) impact of sunspot shocks, but only when the monetary authority has complete information. In other words, the monetary authority can o¤set the real impact of a con…dence shock when the shock can be fully observed. When the con…dence shock is observed with a lag, the ability of the monetary authority to stabilize the real economy is severely hindered.
The results presented in this paper can be considered a deeper, quantitative analysis of the qualitative conclusions proved in Dressler (2009a) . Using a simple monetary environment along the lines of Carlstrom and Feurst (2001) , the main results of Dressler (2009a) was that equilibrium indeterminacy does not depend on a large degree of ES in intermediation nor a large intermediation sector. What indeterminacy does depend on is monetary policy and 2 The degree of increasing returns needed for indeterminacy in environments with one sector of production [e.g. Farmer and Guo (1994) and Gali (1994) ] far exceeds the estimates of Basu and Fernald (1997) . Furthermore, Farmer (1993) shows that indeterminacy arises in cash-in-advance economies only for weak degrees of intertemporal substitution. the determination of nominal interest rates. In other words, models with multiple mediums of exchange must have equal margin costs of using each medium in equilibrium. The cost of deposit use is the potential source of indeterminacy in the environment, and the cost of currency is the nominal interest rate. Therefore, the determination of nominal interest rates becomes a crucial ingredient in the environment. If the monetary authority chooses to not target nominal interest rates and allows them to be in ‡uenced by changes in deposit costs, then indeterminacy from …nancial intermediation manifests itself as an indeterminacy in the nominal interest rate path. When the monetary authority targets the nominal rate, as in following a backward-looking Taylor (1993)-type rule, the nominal rate (and the cost of deposits) are realized and indeterminacy fails to arise for any degree of ES.
Given these previously established results, the present analysis restricts attention to monetary policies which are either exogenous or target money growth rates similar to McCallum (1993)-type rules, and quantitatively explores the degree of ES necessary for indeterminacy and the quantitative importance of the resulting non-fundamental shocks. The impact of these shocks are quanti…ed through a calibration exercise using the 1982 adoption of a nominal interest rate targeting rule by the US as a natural experiment (see Meulendyke, 1989 , ch 2). Prior to 1982, indeterminacy from the …nancial intermediation sector could impact economic volatility, but not after. Since this policy change occurred around the time the US observed a large decline in economic volatility (termed the Great Moderation), the exercise can assess a consequence of this policy change that has not been previously considered.
Depending on the degree of nominal wage rigidity, the model accounts for up to 10 percent of the decline in output volatility that Stock and Watson (2003) were unable to explicitly account for in their assessment of the Great Moderation and attributed to "other unknown forms of good luck".
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the model dynamics. Section 4 concludes.
The Model and Equilibrium

The Model
Time is discrete and the horizon is in…nite. The economy is populated by a continuum of households indexed by i 2 [0; 1] which supply di¤erentiated labor, a continuum of industries which produce di¤erentiated goods indexed by j 2 [0; 1] with a large number of perfectly-competitive …rms operating is each industry, a …nancial intermediary, and a monetary authority. Each of these agents are described in turn.
Households
The preferences of household i are given by
Both deposits and currency can be used to purchase consumption. As in the standard cash-in-advance model, previously held currency balances can costlessly purchase consumption goods. Deposits are chosen at the beginning of the period and pay interest, but bear a …xed real cost for each consumption good purchased. This cost can be interpreted as a per-check processing cost.
The use of money balances deliver the conditions
where P j (t) denotes the price of consumption good j; P k (t) is the price of capital (and capital deposits), and Jm and Jd are subsets of [0; 1] which denote the good types purchased with currency and deposits, respectively. The indicator function 1 Jm (j) (1 Jd (j)) equals one if a particular good of type j is a member of Jm (Jd), and equal zero otherwise.
Household i is a monopoly supplier of type-i labor which is sold to all …rms. Since households substitute imperfectly for one another in production, each household sells it labor in a monopolistically-competitive market: household i sets the nominal wage W i j (t) to a representative …rm from industry j (henceforth, …rm j) such that it satis…es …rm j's demand taking all prices as given. It is assumed that the household faces a quadratic cost of adjusting its nominal wage as in Rotemberg (1982) ,
where governs the size of the real adjustment cost and denotes the gross, long-run in ‡ation rate.
The ‡ow budget constraint of household i is given by
1 Jd (j) dj denotes the total cost of using deposits.
Production
There are j types of output produced, and there exists a large number of perfectlycompetitive …rms producing each type. A representative type j …rm hires di¤erentiated labor from every household i and aggregates these labor services into a homogeneous labor input H j (t) using the CES technology:
where denotes the elasticity of substitution between labor types. 3 The production technology for type j output is a CRS function of capital and aggregate labor: y j (t) = f (z (t) ; K j (t) ; H j (t)) ; where z (t) denotes the exogenous level of total factor productivity identical across …rms and evolves according to z (t) = z + z z (t 1) + " z (t)
Pro…ts of a representative type j …rm are given by
where P j (t) is taken as given. 3 One could easily establish an equivalent environment where an additional production sector aggregates heterogeneous labor units and sells homogeneous labor units to good producing …rms as in Erceg et al. (2000) . Allowing each …rm to hire heterogeneous labor is employed here simply to streamline the environment.
Financial Intermediaries
The …nancial intermediary accepts capital deposits from households and grants capital loans to …rms. As discussed above, the bene…t to saving in the form of deposits rather than currency is the earned interest r d ; while the bene…t to deposits relative to direct capital investment is that deposits can purchase consumption (for a processing cost ).
It is assumed that intermediaries have no minimum reserve requirements and therefore lend all of their deposits. 4 The pro…t function of an intermediary can be expressed as
where D (t) denotes aggregate real deposits, and C (D (t)) denotes real operating costs. 5 If these costs are marginally decreasing, the intermediary will exhibit ES. Assuming
There is free entry into intermediation so that if the incumbent intermediary receives positive pro…ts, another intermediary can enter and capture the market. Therefore, zero pro…ts in (8) generates the following average-cost pricing rule
where (t) = C (D (t)) =D (t) = D (t) denotes average (per deposit) operating costs. 6 The Monetary Authority
The budget constraint of the monetary authority is given by
where M (t + 1) denotes the aggregate stock of currency (the monetary base) available at 4 The results presented below are relatively unchanged if the intermediary is required to keep a minimum, …xed precentage of deposits in reserves. 5 Since the processing costs are passed on to the households [see equation (5)] they do not appear in (8) . 6 Of course, other decentralizations exist such as nonlinear pricing as in Cooper and Corbae (2002) . This would greatly complicate the analysis. each location at the end of period t: The currency base evolves according to M (t + 1) = (t) M (t) where (t) denotes the gross growth rate.
The analysis considers several cases of how the monetary authority chooses (t). The benchmark case considers exogenous monetary policy where money growth evolves according to (10) (t) = + (t 1) + " (t) ;
where " (t) N 0; 2 . Additional cases consider variations of a money growth rule,
where (t) = P (t) =P (t 1) ; P (t) denotes the aggregate price level (de…ned below), and 
Equilibrium Firm j's Problem
Since households choose W i j (t) taking …rm j's demand as given, it is bene…cial to establish the model equilibrium by …rst outlining the …rm's problem.
A representative type j …rm chooses K j (t) and h i j (t) 8i in order to maximize pro…ts (7) subject to (6) . A pro…t-maximizing …rm equates the marginal product of each input with its marginal cost.
De…ning the left-hand side of (13) to be …rm j's nominal wage index W j (t) illustrates …rm j's demand for type i's labor, (14) h
which is a typical result of models featuring nominal-wage rigidity (e.g. Erceg et al., 2000) .
Household i's Problem
Household i's problem is to maximize (1) subject to (3), (4), (5) and (14) by choosing
; and W i j (t) 8j taking all prices as given. This problem can be simpli…ed by solving an equivalent problem where household i chooses composite consumption c i (t) taking as given a composite price (or price index) P (t) : Explicitly, household i's problem is equivalent to maximizing the expected discounted value of (1) subject to
and (5) with
The indicator functions and weights ' j in (15) and (16) keep track of consumption purchased with currency and deposits. While leaving the details to an appendix, the …rst order conditions of this equivalent problem can be used to de…ne the price index as a function of weighted good prices, as well as a demand for type j consumption given the elasticity of substitution $.
In order to simplify the problem, it is assumed that the di¤erentiated consumption goods are perfect complements (i.e. ! ! 0) and the consumption weights ' j are chosen to deliver an ordinal ranking of consumption good types. Letting ' j = 2j so R 1 0 ' j dj = 1; equations (17) and (18) become
These assumptions result in the price index being a weighting of di¤erentiated prices, and the demand for each good is its weighted contribution to total consumption. Note the smaller the value of j; the smaller the contribution good c i j (t) is to composite consumption c i (t).
The …nal step in characterizing household i's problem is to address the following question:
is it more attractive to purchase c i j (t) with currency or deposits? If a household purchases c i j (t) with deposits, the real end-of-period cost is given by
which illustrates that in addition to purchasing the good, the household gives up the interest spread (r (t) r d (t)) by depositing (instead of directly investing) capital and pays the check processing cost. If a household purchases c i j (t) with currency, the real cost is given by
which illustrates that the needed currency was acquired last period. Substitution of (9) and (20) into these costs and comparing them results in
where P j (t) is replaced with P (t). Equation (21) illustrates that the cost to using deposits approaches in…nity as j approaches zero (all else equal). In other words, some consumption goods are purchased in quantities small enough such that the cost to using deposits ( ) outweighs the return. Therefore, de…ne j i (t) to be a critical good type such that household i is indi¤erent to purchasing c i j (t) with either currency or deposits because they share the same cost,
;
and all goods j above (below) j i (t) will be purchased with deposits (currency). This delivers
Household i's constraint set can now be stated in terms of composite consumption c i (t) ; the price index P (t) and the critical good index j i (t) ;
and
Since composite consumption can be transformed into units of investment, P k (t) = P (t) :
; and W i j (t) ; 8j in order to maximize (1) subject to (14) , (23), (24), and (25) taking all prices and the state of the economy as given. The transformation of the generalized problem to the simpli…ed problem, as well as illustrating that (22) can be derived from the …rst-order conditions of the household's optimization problem are detailed in an appendix.
Market Clearing and De…nition of Equilibrium
Given that all households face the same elasticity regarding their labor demand ( ), and all …rms are perfectly competitive within their respective industry, we can restrict attention to symmetric labor and goods market equilibria and treat household i as a representative household and …rm j as a representative …rm. Therefore,
Goods market clearing is given by
where Y (t) = R 1 0 (2j) y j (t) dj conforms with composite consumption, and I (t) = K (t + 1)
(1 ) K (t) denotes aggregate investment. Equation (26) states that aggregate output is distributed amongst consumption, investment, and aggregate …nancial and wage adjustment costs. Capital market clearing is given by K (t) = k (t).
Currency market clearing is given by M (t) = m (t). A broader monetary aggregate
(M 1 (t)) is de…ned as the nominal sum of currency and deposits,
where the third equality de…nes M1 as the product of the currency base and the endogenously determined money multiplier. Zero-net supply in the bond market results in B (t) = 0:
The decision rules of the households, …rms, and pricing functions can now be de…ned as functions of k (t) ; W (t 1) ; (t) (exogenous or endogenous), and the fundamental shock z (t) : When ES in the …nancial intermediary sector delivers equilibrium indeterminacy, it is assumed that agents also base their decisions upon observing a non-fundamental sunspot or con…dence shock (t). Therefore, for all fk (t) ; W (t 1) ; (t) ; z (t) ; (t)g, an equilibrium is de…ned as a list of prices fP (t) ; r (t) ; r d (t) ; W (t) ; R (t)g and allocations fk (t + 1) ; m (t + 1) ; h (t) ; c (t) ; j (t) ; d (t) ; B (t)g such that: (i) households maximize
(1) subject to (23) , (24) , and (25), (ii) …rms maximize pro…ts, (iii) labor demand is determined by (14) , (iv) the markets for goods (26) , currency, bonds, and deposits (D (t) = d (t))
clear, and (v) (t) = d (t) :
Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative analysis begins with stating the functional form assumptions, model calibration, and alternative monetary policies used throughout the analysis. A search is then conducted over a subset of the parameter space for zones where the model dynamics are either determinate (unique) or indeterminate, and the dynamic properties of the model under indeterminacy are analyzed. The section concludes with a calibration exercise to assess the elimination of the non-fundamental shocks on the observed decline in US volatility during the 1980s (the Great Moderation).
Functional Forms and Calibration
The functional forms and parameter values are determined according to the businesscycle literature (e.g. Cooley and Hansen, 1989 ) and so the resulting steady state of the model matches particular long-run properties of the US economy.
The money growth rate ( 1) is set to 3 percent annually, and the discount parameter is calibrated to 0:99 so the annual real interest rate is roughly 4 percent.
Investment is one quarter of steady state output. With a 10 percent depreciation rate, the capital stock to annual output ratio is 2.5. The production function is assumed to be
; and is calibrated so labor's share of national income is roughly two-thirds.
The parameters governing the evolution of technology shocks ( z ; z ) are respectively set to 0:95 and 0:0076 as in Prescott (1986) .
The utility function is assumed to be c (1 h)
The parameter is calibrated so a household's average allocation of time to market activity (net of sleep and personal care) is one-third which is in line with estimates of Ghez and Becker (1975) . V is set to 2 which is within the range of results reported by Neely et al. (2001) .
The parameter is calibrated so the average mark-up of type i labor is …ve percent as in post-war US data (see Christiano et al., 2005) . The cost parameter governing nominal wage changes ( ) corresponds to an average wage duration of 3 quarters. 7 The benchmark model assumes exogenous monetary policy given by (10) with and respectively set to 0:32 and 0:0038 as in Christiano (1991) and Fuerst (1992) . Under endogenous monetary policy (11), two cases are considered where the elasticity of the money growth rate to observed changes in in ‡ation 1 is set to 0:5 and 0:999, respectively. 8 A third case sets elasticity at 0:5 and assumes that the monetary authority does not initially observe the sunspot shock ( (t) = 2 (t)).
Three parameters remaining to be determined are the check-writing cost ( ), and the 7 See Chugh (2006) for a mapping from Rotemberg-style costs to Calvo-style rigidity. 8 The normalized monetary policy rule is^ (t) = 1 ^ (t) ; where a hat refers to percentage changes and the elasticity is given by 1 . Therefore, an elasticity of 0:5 ( 0:999) results in = 1 ( 1000) :
parameters de…ning the cost of managing deposits ( and ) : Since is central to indeterminacy of equilibria in the model, it is treated as a free parameter and analyzed in the following section. The remaining two parameters are pinned down so the model's steady state matches the US deposit-currency ratio and the value added of the …nancial intermediation sector. The deposit-currency ratio is de…ned as dP=m and set to 7. This ratio is close to the post-war minimum considering that two-thirds to three-quarters of the US currency base is held abroad (see Porter and Judson, 1996) . 9 Value added is de…ned as total bank- (Table 3a) . While this value added has undoubtedly changed over the last 18 years, it is not clear how much of this measure is represented by the simple structure of …nancial intermediaries in the model. Still, this information serves as an upper bound for the size of the …nancial intermediary sector considered here.
Economies of Scale and Indeterminacy
While a concave cost function is su¢cient for banks to exhibit ES in textbook models of banking (e.g. Freixas and Rochet, 1997), it may not be su¢cient for equilibrium indeterminacy in the model because the banking sector is small relative to the aggregate economy by construction. The equilibrium properties of the model over values of and the value added of the intermediary sector are illustrated in Figure 1 . The shaded and non-shaded regions correspond to parameter values which deliver determinate and indeterminate equilibria, respectively. 10 The …gure illustrates that slight changes to the value added of the intermediation sector e¤ects the minimum (absolute value) of required for indeterminacy. The quantitative analysis proceeds with a conservative degree of ES and sets = 0:01:
The minimum value added delivering indeterminacy under this degree of ES is approximately 1:15 percent, which is below the range determined by Diaz-Gimenez et al. (1992) . A sensitivity analysis below considers several points within the indeterminacy zone to con…rm the robustness of the model predictions. 
Model Results
All versions of the model presented above are solved following the solution algorithm proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) . They show that when a model exhibits indeterminacy, the rational expectations forecast errors of the economic agents can be decomposed into in ‡uences from the fundamental and non-fundamental shocks. However, while the nonfundamental shock can be interpreted as a reduced-form sunspot shock, one needs to make an additional assumption in order to uniquely identify the transmission of the fundamental shocks on the forecast errors. The analysis therefore considers both identi…cation schemes proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide: orthogonality and continuity. Under orthogonality, the in ‡uences of the fundamental and non-fundamental shocks are uniquely identi…ed by assuming that they are orthogonal to each other. Under continuity, the fundamental shocks are identi…ed by imposing that their in ‡uence on the endogenous forecast errors do not abruptly change when the economy transitions from regions of determinacy to indeterminacy. The bene…t of considering the continuity assumption is that the dynamics of the model in response to the fundamental shocks under indeterminacy preserves properties that the model dynamics exhibit under determinacy. Therefore, considering both identi…cation assumptions allows the analysis to assess not only the e¤ect of the sunspot shock on the economy, but how ES in banking in ‡uences the impact of the fundamental shocks. The solution algorithm and the use of both identi…cation assumptions are detailed in an appendix.
Benchmark Model: Exogenous Monetary Policy
The response of the model to positive (one-percent) monetary and sunspot shocks are illustrated in Figure 2 . First consider the events following a monetary shock under the continuity assumption. An injection of currency immediately increases the price level and leads to an increase in the in ‡ation rate. The increase in in ‡ation makes deposits more attractive than currency (i.e. j (t) decreases), and the increase in deposit holdings results in a further increase in prices because more currency is used to purchase a smaller portion of consumption. Nominal wage rigidity makes it costly to adjust wages as prices increase, and the decline in real wages results in increases in labor demand and all other real aggregates.
In the period following the shock, prices remain above steady state along with the portion of consumption purchased with deposits (i.e. j (t) remains below steady state). Real wages remain below steady state, so real aggregates remain above. Eventually, an increase in the demand for currency returns all nominal variables to their steady state values. Once the paths of prices and nominal wages align, the real wage and all other real aggregates return to steady state.
Under the orthogonality assumption, the initial impact to a monetary shock is qualitatively similar to the impact under continuity. Prices, M1, and j (t) illustrate that deposits become more attractive. ES in the intermediary implies that the shift towards deposits in‡uences the net deposit rate (r (t) (t)) ; and the initial impact of a monetary shock is diminished. In the following period, prices decline below steady state resulting in currency becoming more attractive. As households choose to hold less deposits, the net return to deposits declines. This results in a persistent shift away from deposits, illustrated by the persistent increase in j (t) and the persistent decrease in M1. This persistence is only in nominal variables; the real economy again returns to steady state once nominal wages and prices align.
The …nal set of impulse responses in Figure 2 illustrates the impact of a positive onepercent sunspot shock. Quantitatively speaking, the real impact of a sunspot shock is approximately one-half the size of a monetary shock calculated under continuity and three-quarters the size under orthogonality. The reason for these similar predictions stems from the fact that both monetary and sunspot shocks impact the economy through the households' liquidity preference and the portfolio choice of cash and deposit holdings. A sunspot shock induces agents to increase deposit holdings due to a perceived decrease in the cost to intermediating assets, resulting in deposits dominating currency for a larger portion of total consumption purchases. The increase in deposit holdings results in an immediate increase in M1 and prices, while the nominal interest rate declines. The decline in real wages again increases the demand for labor and real aggregates. In the following period, the increase in deposits keeps the net return high and delivers the persistence in Prices, M1, and j (t) : Although nominal aggregates continue to remain far from steady state, nominal wages and prices eventually align so the real economy converges to its pre-shock state. Figure 3 illustrates the impulse responses of the economy to a positive, one-percent productivity shock under both the continuity and orthogonality assumptions. As is common in business-cycle analyses, a positive productivity shock increases real output as well as real and nominal interest rates. Deposits become more attractive than currency, so there is an endogenous increase in broad monetary aggregates. The real responses of the model under the orthogonality and continuity assumptions are roughly identical. This supports the fact that although indeterminacy is introduced through a real cost, the impact of this mechanism lies in the nominal side of the economy. For nominal variables (the bottom six panels), the continuity and orthogonality assumptions result in di¤erent impulse responses. Under orthogonality, ES in banking implies a larger increase in deposits due to decreasing marginal costs. A larger portion of total consumption is purchased with these deposits, resulting in a smaller decline in prices because the household's previously held currency balances are used to purchase a smaller portion of total consumption. Nonetheless, the nominal movements have no noticeable impact on the real aggregates under either assumption. Since the size of the …nancial sector is small relative to the rest of the real economy, ES in the banking sector does not add much to real shocks. 
Endogenous Monetary Policy
The dynamic responses to a sunspot shock under endogenous monetary policy are compared with the benchmark model in Figure 4 . 12 The intuition behind the policy rule (11) The analysis also considers the case when the monetary authority cannot observe the sunspot shock ( (t) = 2 (t)) : This case is di¢cult to see in Figure 4 because the response is exactly the same as the response under exogenous monetary policy. Since the sunspot shock has zero persistence, the in ‡ation response is immediate and dies out in the period after the shock. Therefore, the monetary authority has nothing to observe in the period following the shock because in ‡ation has already returned to its long-run level. In other words, the real impact has already been felt and any response would no longer be warranted. 
Sensitivity Analysis
This section brie ‡y assesses the robustness of the above results to two key assumptions: the degree of ES in the intermediary ( ), and the size of the intermediation sector (quanti…ed by value added).
To get some sense of from the data, taking the log of (9) delivers a regression equation, (28) log (r (t) r d (t)) = log ( ) + log (D (t)) ;
where the left-hand side is the logged spread between real lending and deposit rates, while the right-hand side is the log-linearized version of (t). The results for estimating (28) over the full US post-war data and two subsamples are presented in Table 2 . 13 Considering up to two lagged dependent variables was su¢cient to render white noise residuals for all cases. with the benchmark value added of 1:15 percent, and (Case 2) = 0:8666 and a value added equal to 1:05 percent. Together with the benchmark result, these three cases roughly 13 The spread between lending and deposit rates was taken to be the spread between the prime lending rate (series name: MPRIME) and the 3 month Tbill rate (series name: TB3MS), while real deposits were de…ned as the sum of M1: demand deposits and M1: other checkable deposits (series names: DD.US and OCD.US) de ‡ated by the GDP de ‡ator (series name: GDPDEF). The annualized interest rate data was transformed into gross, monthly rates, and trends were removed from all variables using the HP …lter. All monthly data was transformed to quarterly by taking three-month averages. The data sample from 1959:1 to 2006:4 is available from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. span the indeterminacy zone. prices. The decline in prices is larger than the rise in deposits, which results in the decline in M1 (see (27) ). The real e¤ect of the persistent decline in prices is o¤set by an equivalent decline in nominal wages, which explains the equivalence in real output. 
The Great Moderation: A Calibration Exercise
While the above analysis compares the impact of fundamental and nonfundamental shocks of equal size, it fails to consider the relative sizes of these shocks. This issue is addressed here through a calibration exercise concerning the quantitative importance of removing these sunspot shocks on the observed decline in economic volatility observed in the US during the 1980s (termed the Great Moderation). As discussed in the introduction, Dressler (2008) explicitly shows that the equilibrium indeterminacy examined above ceases to exist when the monetary authority follows an explicit interest rate rule. Since monetary policies other that interest rate rules were in use before 1982, this suggests that non-fundamental shocks might have had an impact before 1982, but not after. The present exercise therefore uses the policy adoption as a natural experiment to identify the relative sizes of the fundamental and non-fundamental shocks, and assess their quantitative importance on economic volatility.
The exercise …rst sets out by identifying the reduction in economic volatility that a model without durable goods, …scal policies, and international sectors can hope to explain. The …rst row of Table 3 presents the percentage change in the standard deviation of output (de…ned as the sum of nondurable consumption, services, and investment) and prices (de…ned as the CPI) in US data before and after the identi…ed break of the …rst quarter of 1984.
14 Although the data de…nitions di¤er from earlier analyses of the Great Moderation, they indicate a 38 percent decline in output volatility and a 63.5 percent decline in price volatility.
The next step is to use the pre-1984:1 data to calibrate the standard deviations of the three exogenous shocks f z ; ; g in the benchmark model. These parameters are unidenti…ed in steady state, so they are chosen to minimize the distance between the standard deviations of output (1:9287), the monetary base (0:8315), and M1 (1:6176) observed in the pre-1984:1 data with simulations of the model. 15 The calibration exercise was performed for two degrees of nominal wage rigidity: the benchmark case ( = 6:03) ; and a higher value Monthly data was made quarterly by taking monthly averages, and trends were removed using the HP …lter. 15 These three moments were chosen to best identify the standard deviations of the shocks. The details of the calibration exercise are described in an appendix. While the calculated decline in output volatility appears small, this simple exercise accounts for 2.5 to 10 percent of the observed decline that Stock and Watson (2003) were unable to explicitly account for (depending on the degree of nominal rigidity). This impact is rather signi…cant considering that the sector giving rise to these sunspot shocks makes up a small part of the economy.
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to quantitatively assess the economic e¤ects of indeterminacy 
Appendices Household i's Generalized and Aggregated Problems
This appendix outlines both the generalized and aggregated problems of the household, and shows that given the assumptions of zero elasticity of substitution between good types and the speci…c weighting scheme, they are equivalent.
The generalized problem of household i can be stated as
where
The …rst order conditions for choices of c i j (t) 8j 2 Jm; c
; 8j:
The aggregated problem of household i can be stated as and the …rst order condition for the choice of c i (t) is given by
The remaining …rst order conditions (with the exception of the multipliers) are identical to the generalized problem.
Deriving the aggregate price and consumption demand equations begins with the claim (and veri…cation) that the problems above are equivalent. This claim implies that the multipliers are equivalent (e.g.^ (2) and integrating both sides with respect to j:
Substitution of these multipliers into (36) results in
Since Jm and Jd span the set of goods, i 3 (t) and u c i (t) drops out leaving
Verifying that the multipliers are equal (and the problems are equivalent) can be done by verifying that P (t) c i (t) = R 
Raising both sides to the power $; rearranging terms, integrating both sides with respect to j; and using (40) veri…es the result and delivers (18) .
Under the aggregated problem, household optimization is characterized by the binding constraint set and the Euler equations
; 8j (43) and (44)
Using (9) and r (t) (t) = 1 + R (t) ; it is easy to show that the …rst-order condition for the household's choice of j i (t) is equivalent to (22) , suggesting that the optimal choice for the composition of money balances is chosen such that their costs of use are equated.
Model Solution
The solution methodology described in this appendix follows Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) and their extension of Sims (2001). After removing all multipliers from the household's …rst-order conditions and imposing symmetry, the normalized system of equations comprising the dynamic solution are given by u c (t) (t) E (t) P (t) P (t + 1) (t + 1) u c (t) 1 + 2j (t + 1) c (t + 1) + d (t + 1) (t + 1) = 0 u c (t) (t) E (t) r (t + 1) u c (t + 1) (t + 1) = 0 u h (t) h (t) + u c (t) (t) (1 ) W (t) h (t) P (t) z (t) = z + z z (t 1) + " z (t) (t) = + (t 1) + " (t)
where (t) = h 1 + j (t) 2c(t) + d (t) i 1 : After the above system is log-linearized around the model's steady state, the dimension of the system is reduced by using the bottom …ve equations to remove fc (t) ; h (t) ; j (t) ; r (t) ; d (t)g. The remaining …ve equations (and six identities) comprise the linear rational expectations model and can be represented in the canonical form:
(46) 0 s (t) = 1 s (t 1) + " (t) + # (t) where s (t) = [k (t + 1) ; W (t) ; P (t) ; z (t) ; (t) ; E (t) k (t + 2) ; E (t) W (t + 1) ; E (t) P (t + 1)] 0 " (t) = [" z (t) ; " (t)] 0 # (t) = [k (t + 1) E (t 1) k (t + 1) ; W (t) E (t 1) W (t) ; P (t) E (t 1) P (t)] where, without loss of generality, the system has been partitioned such that the lower blocks of ; and Q correspond to the portion of the system delivering unstable eigenvalues. In other words, the lower block contains all equations in which the ratio between the diagonal elements of and are greater than unity.
This 'explosive' block is written as $ 2 (t) = A non-explosive solution of the model requires $ 2 (t) = 08t 0: This is accomplished by choosing $ 2 (0) = 0 and for every vector " (t) the endogenous forecast error # (t) that satis…es Using the singular value decomposition = U DV 0 ; a general solution for the endogenous forecast errors is given by
where M 1 and M 2 govern the in ‡uence of the sunspot shock. 
For a corresponding determinacy solution, the impulse response is given bỹ This result is substituted in (48) while maintaining M 2 = 1:
Calibration Exercise
Let denote a vector of standard deviations calculated from data, and ( ) denote the corresponding calculations from a simulation of the model where denotes the vector of parameters to be calibrated. The parameter vector delivered by the calibration exercise is that which minimizes
where is an identity matrix.
The calibration exercise chooses to be a 3 1 vector consisting of the pre-1984:1 standard deviations of real output, the monetary base and M1 (the data), and is a 3 1
vector of standard deviations of the exogenous shocks of the model (the parameters). Note that minimizing the above expression would be equivalent to a simulated method of moments exercise if were replaced by a weighting matrix that corresponds to the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of :
